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Identifying Real Dichotomies

Underlying the False Dichotomy:

Twenty-First Century Mediation in
an Eclectic Regime
Jeffrey W. Stempef

Preparation for the University of Missouri's lecture on dispute resolution and
consideration of commentary prompted additional thoughts on the issue and a more
refined perspective on the issue of facilitation-versus-evaluation and its role in the
continued development of modem ADR. Rather than attempt to fine-tune a
completed article, this reply will address the additional perspectives as well as note
points of distinct conflict or quibble with commentators. First, this reply provides
some additional assessment framing the facilitative-evaluative debate as well as a
modified brief in support of the legitimacy of some elements of evaluation in the
eclectic mediation that is rightfully becoming the norm. Second, I note for the
record a few points of contention with my commentators and additional information
suggesting that the definition of "proper" mediation should be broadly and
eclectically defined so as to permit "trans-substantive" eclectic mediation applied
through the exercise of considerable discretion by the mediator. Finally, I suggest
an agenda for additional ADR research that should receive some of the energy
previously expended on the facilitative-evaluative debate.

I. ANOTHER LOOK AT THE FACILITATIVE-EVALUATIVE DIVIDE
In the main article' and earlier writing,2 I have argued that the definition of
mediation according to the facilitative-evaluative dichotomy is unrealistically
formalist as well as theoretically and empirically erroneous. In this issue's article,
I have argued that the facilitative-evaluative split results from the analytic errors of
overly formalist thinking and the history and sociology of the modem ADR
movement. However, formalism persists in law and society, of course, because it

* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, William S. Boyd School of Law,
University of Nevada Las Vegas. Thanks to Len Riskin, Jean Stemlight, and official commentators John
Lande, Richard Birke, Kim Kovach, Lela Love, Zena Zumeta, and Gary Gill-Austem as well to
unofficial commentators attending the Alternative Dispute Resolution lecture at the University of
Missouri and a faculty workshop at UNLV, including Raquel Aldana-Pindel, Bret Birdsong, Ann
McGinley, and particularly Lynne Henderson. Continued thanks to Jim Rogers for his generous support
of legal education and scholarship and to Dean Richard Morgan for his enthusiasm for ADR.
I. See Jeffrey W.Stempel, The Inevitabilityof the Eclectic: Liberating ADR from Ideology, 2000 J.
Disp. RESOL. 247.

2. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Beyond Formalismand False Dichotomies: The Need for Institutionalizing
a Flexible Concept of the Mediator's Role, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 949 (1997).
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has its educational uses. At the risk of falling prey to the classification dichotomy
I have previously criticized, I want to suggest that the facilitative-evaluative divide
is in significant part a reflection of two other divisions within both the ADR
community and the legal community at large.
A. The Procedure-SubstanceSplit
Some people (lawyers, scholars, judges, dispute resolvers, policymakers) are
more concerned about fidelity to procedural protocols while others are more
concerned with the substantive rules governing disputes and substantive outcomes.
Those in the dispute resolution community preferring facilitation tend to be
proceduralists. For them, the observance of proper procedure is a high goal, perhaps
the dominant goal. They reason, often implicitly, that adherence to the rules of
procedure is the essence of neutrality, fairness, and the proper role of a dispute
resolving apparatus.' At some level, usually subconscious, there is a post-modem
philosophical aspect of this preference. Because humans cannot perfectly know
what is the "correct" result in a dispute, it is unwise to attempt to construct a
yardstick for evaluating substantive outcomes. 4 However, we can construct a system
of procedures that may be followed from case to case. The outcomes of each case
may be that the chips fall where they may, but this is of less concern than knowing
that the system producing these falling chips followed an announced neutral format.
For others, the decisional framework governing disputes and the quality of
outcomes in disputes is paramount. In extreme cases of this view, the end justifies
the means. Recall the famous comment from the Vietnam War, where one soldier
was infamously quoted saying "we destroyed the village to save it."5 One can find
numerous historical examples where preference for a substantive outcome turned
into the atrocities of the zealot. 6 As something of a cheerleader for evaluation as a
legitimate part of eclectic mediation, I do not intend to suggest that evaluators are
so committed to a certain result or range of results to inflict similar violence on
proper mediation procedure in order to ensure that mediated settlements meet their

3. See Stempel, supra note 1,at 252-55 nn.16-31 (describing facilitative theory of mediation and
approach to mediation).
4. See MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES Ch. 3 (1987) (suggesting that legal

process school's commitment to procedural neutrality fails to adequately address concerns of critical
legal scholars); Peter Schank, Understanding Postmodern Thought and Its Implications for Statutory
Interpretation,65 S. CAL. L. REV. 2505 (1992). Many, perhaps most, post-modernists would take issue
with my contention that being post-modem makes one a proceduralist. Some would say that being postmodem might make one more likely to embrace a preferred substantive result in disputes or policy
debates on the ground that since truth is a socially constructed matter, society may as well construct and
embrace "better" truths (i.e., those preferred by the speaker or writer). See generally GARY MINDA,
POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S END (1995); DENNIS
PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH (1996). On the other hand, however, being post-modem, or even nonfundamentalist about the concept of truth or correctness in my view tends to make one less absolute
about the right-or-wrong of dispute outcomes, which pushes toward a more proceduralist yardstick for
defining good and bad in society and dispute resolution.
5. Major Describes Move, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 1968, at 14.
6. Next door to Halberstam's chronicle of excessive military zealotry was a more chilling example,
the rise of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia, where commitment to an agrarian socialist society was used
to justify mass murder of intellectuals. Less bloodcurdling examples abound in politics and law.
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substantive criteria. However, I think it is fair to say that those supporting the right
of mediators to introduce some element of evaluation where necessary (myself
included) are suggesting that for them substantive rules of decision and outcomes are
as important as fidelity to a nonadversarial or nonjudgmental procedure. 7
When it falls short of mania, a commitment to substantively good outcomes
often results in a useful commitment to fairness and justice. Similarly, if fidelity to
agreed procedure is not carried to extremes or used to blind the proceduralist to the
overall quality issues, a commitment to procedure provides many benefits. But
either orientation alone or applied to the extreme can prove problematic. In practice,
we should not be surprised that most lawyers and other dispute resolvers (indeed,
most people) are eclectic in their approach to the proper balance of substance and
procedure. Despite the everyday eclecticism of society in this regard, it can clarify
our thinking about dispute resolution to take into account this procedure-substance
division among the profession. The divide between those who privilege procedure
and those who prefer substance may explain the facilitative-evaluative division as
well as any other factors, including the historical and sociological divisions
addressed in the primary article. 8
The additional dichotomy of procedure-substance pervades law and society and
also accounts for some of the facilitative-evaluative division. In litigation in
particular, there has long been a tension between procedure and substance. As
discussed in the main article, lawyers have differed over the degree to which
litigation procedure should be generic or substance-specific. The generic
proceduralists carried the day during the Twentieth Century, particularly with the
enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Federal Rules") in 1938. 9
Subsequent developments have whittled away at that construct. We now have local
rules and standing orders that tend to differentiate among types of cases more than
the Federal Rules. The dispute resolution local rules tend to be less generic. Not all
cases must have mandatory arbitration or mediation or early neutral evaluation.
Usually, it is the domestic relations matters and the "garden variety" contract and tort
claims (up to a certain amount of claimed damages) that are part of court-sponsored
dispute resolution.'°
Still, the litigation system is largely generically proceduralist. The federal courts
and the states have rules of procedure that do not on their face distinguish between
the type of dispute at hand. Eclectic application of such general procedure has
historically been our legal system's answer to the tension between substance and
procedure. Federal Rules author Charles Clark referred to his generic, open courts
procedure as the "Handmaid of Justice."" A leading civil procedure casebook

7. See Stempel, supra note 1, at 252-55 nn.21-31 (describing views of evaluative mediation).
8. See Stempel, supra note 1, at 271-85 nn.96-154 (describing history of mediation and sociological
background of mediators, arguing that these factors account for a significant amount of facilitativeevaluative division).
9. See Stempel, supra note 1, at 251 n. 13; Stempel, supra note 1, nn. 141-46 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., FLA. R. Civ. P. 12.740 (requiring mediation of family law and small claims disputes);
MINN. R. Civ. P. 114 (requiring mediation of disputes prior to trial); E.D. PA. LOCAL R. Civ. P. 49
(establishing court-annexed arbitration for tort and contract disputes where damage demand is less than
$75,000 and there is no request for injunctive relief).
11. See CHARLES CLARK, PROCEDURE, THE HANDMAID OF JUSTICE: ESSAYS OF JUDGE CHARLES E.
CLARK (C,Wright & H. Reasoner eds., 1965).
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suggests that the yardstick for evaluating procedure is whether it tends to produce
just, equitable, and efficient resolution of disputes. 2 The eclectic part of the
equation is this: a judge may be applying generic procedure but in a case involving
problematic claims such as a defamation suit seeking millions in punitive damages,
the judge may subtly demand more of the plaintiff in the way of detailed pleading
specifying the alleged untruth and its impact on the claimant." By contrast, where
the plaintiff has no lawyer and is attempting to stave off foreclosure of a modest
home, the court may require less in the way of procedural formality through a
relaxed application of the rules.' 4

B. The DisputantSatisfaction-JustOutcomes Split
Of course, to say that a system serves justice perhaps begs the question of what
is "justice." Although this question pervades the law, it is particularly pronounced
in the area of dispute resolution. In the dispute resolution community, it appears that
some measure justice mostly by whether the disputants are satisfied with the
resolution of their controversy (it may no longer even be seen as a controversy
because of the skill of the mediator). Others measure outcomes by the substantive
quality of the resolution in light of the legal system's default rules (or perhaps a
yardstick different than the baseline legal norm for such decisions). To
oversimplify: some view a "good" mediation as one that results in a resolution where
the contestants walk away satisfied; others view a good mediation as one that reaches
Generally, the former are disproportionately
a substantively good result."
facilitative and the latter are disproportionately evaluative. 6

12. See JOHN J. COUND ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 4 (6th ed. 1993).
13. See 2 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 12.34[l][b] (3d ed. 1997 &
Supp. 2000); DAVID F. HERR ET AL., MOTION PRACTICE §§ 9.3,9.4 (3d ed. 1998 & Supp. 2000) (stating
that defamation claims are disfavored and courts as a practical matter require more detailed pleading for
these to succeed).
14. See Dioguardi v. Duming, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944) (taking relaxed or liberalized view of
pleading requirements on behalf of pro se litigant of limited sophistication who was not fluent in
English, in famous opinion by FederalRules author Charles Clark).
15. See CRAIG MCEWEN & NANCY ROGERS, MEDIATION §§ 6:14-6:19 (2d ed. 1994 & Supp. 1999)
(discussing means of evaluating mediation quality); DWIGHT GOLANN, MEDIATING LEGAL DISPUTES
(1996) (discussing means of evaluating mediation quality). Commentator Zena Zumeta puts it this way:
"Who owns the dispute and its resolution?" See Zena Zumeta, A FacilitativeMediator Responds, 2000
J. DIsP. RESOL. 335, 338. In essence, Zumeta, a self-styled facilitator or transformative mediator has
embraced the "party satisfaction" measure of assessing the quality of dispute resolution, suggesting that
society has little or no right to police ADR outcomes that satisfy disputants even if they might be in
tension with other social norms. Later, she puts it more starkly: "Power to the parties!" Id. As a member
of the eclectic camp, I cannot give a John Lennonesque "right on" to that statement. A better slogan
might be power to the parties, but not absolute power to the parties or to any single party.
16. See James J. Alfini, Trashing, Bashing, and Hashing It Out: Is This the End of "Good
Mediation?," 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 47 (1991). Although Alfini's well known article is generally cited
for its finding that mediator styles differ and that many mediators incorporated significant evaluative
components into the process, an implicit finding often overlooked in the article is that some mediators
were committed to the facilitative procedure while others introduced the evaluative dimension,
presumably because they were concerned about the outcome of the mediation as well as the desire to
obtain settlement faster or because the mediator was taken with his or her own power. The same implicit
showing exists in Leonard Riskin, UnderstandingMediators' Orientations,Strategiesand Techniques:
A Grid for the Perplexed, I HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 7 (1996), and in the recent empirical study of
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Which camp is "right" in picking a measure for evaluating mediation? Again,
I cast my vote for eclecticism: both measures of quality are important and should
be used in evaluating the caliber of mediation and other forms of ADR. 7 Disputant
satisfaction is an important factor for measuring mediation but so is the substantive
quality of outcomes. For example, a disputant may be so relieved to have a matter
"over and done with" that she may express satisfaction with a mediation that can
only be called a "defeat" according to prevailing legal norms; conversely, a disputant
may be thrilled with the substantive outcome of a mediation that left the other
disputant angry and hurt. Neither outcome is "good" mediation. In practice,
mediators - despite having a presumptive orientation - are probably eclectic and
pragmatic. They want the mediation to produce a result that is at least substantively
defensible and that leaves the participants with at least a minimum level of
satisfaction.
In the harder specific cases and in the hard work of defining the boundaries of
acceptable mediation practice, however, the specific orientation and preference for
a measure of quality will affect one's analysis of what constitutes quality (and,
indeed, justice). Measuring mediation by customer satisfaction may tend to favor
facilitation to the extent participants will probably prefer a nonevaluative,
nonadversarial experience, at least during the process because this may be less
stressful than substantive decision making or directly facing areas of significant
disagreement. But for those with more focus on the actual resolution of disputes,
evaluative mediation (or, more precisely, eclectic mediation with necessary doses of
evaluative behavior) will be preferred.
C. The "Rules Versus Discretion"Split
As I suggested in the main article, a good deal of both the ADR community and
the legal community is divided by their attitudes toward the utility of rules and the
degree of strictness required in announcing and applying rules of decision or norms
of procedure."8 I then framed the distinction as one of formalism versus
functionalism or rules versus standards. Further reflection suggests to me that an
equally important divide is "rules versus discretion." Although this split is of course
a part of the rules versus standards division, the element of discretion may in fact be
the more important variant in this analysis.

mediators found in Dwight Golann, Variationsin Mediation:How - and Why - Legal Mediators Change
Styles in the Course of a Case, 2000 J. DISP. RESOL. 41 (finding mediators to make both evaluative and
facilitative moves in mediation even if largely adhering to a particular style; evaluative intervention may
be directed at need to speed process or concern about substantive outcome).
I should add for clarification: this comment uses the term "evaluative" as a shorthand to describe a
variety of mediator techniques that are to some degree not completely facilitative. I am not suggesting
that a mediator who has made an "evaluative move" has attempted to adjudicate the dispute or to
bludgeon a party into the mediator's preferred substantive outcome.
17. Although this reply, like the main article, is primarily concerned with mediation, its analysis on
issues of evaluation of the proceedings, the need for further research, and doctrinal decisions for the
future applies in many cases to other forms of ADR such as arbitration, early neutral evaluation ("ENE")
and hybrid forms of dispute resolution.
18. See Stempel, supra note 1, at 270 nn.94-96.
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Facilitative mediators, although celebrating the skill of the mediator who leads
disputants to insight without what they regard as improper evaluation, tend
(paradoxically in my view) to fear granting the mediator discretion to evaluate. As
might be expected, eclectic evaluationists are quite comfortable with allowing the
mediator considerable discretion in the conduct of a mediation. This is, of course,
also a facet of what I have termed the excessive ideological-theological attitude held
by some in the ADR community. Once having defined good mediation a particular
way, the definition becomes a rule. Discretionary departures from the rule are
considered too fraught with danger. But as I hope the main article has shown,
excessive constraints on evaluative discretion are at least equally dangerous.
As discussed further below, it may be that one "size" of mediation does not fit
all. However, in attempting to categorize the aptness of mediation style by subject
matter, the inevitable conclusion to me appears to be that subject matter is of far less
importance than the other factors addressed below. 9 The next inevitable conclusion
to follow holds that a mediator must operate under a legal regime that treats eclectic
mediation as legitimate and that permits the mediator substantial discretion to do
what he or she thinks best in each particular case.
D. The PerhapsInherent Unmapability of Mediation Subject Matter
In the main article and during the lecture, I suggested that one means of
reconciling the facilitative-evaluative tension might be to recognize that some
disputes are more amenable to a more facilitative approach while others are more
suited to a more evaluative mediation style (or rather, eclectic mediation with more
evaluative events). In particular, I suggested that issues such as child custody and
visitation might on the whole be better mediated in classic facilitative manner
(assuming good faith by the parties) while contract and tort disputes between
strangers would on the whole see more evaluation. 0 At the lecture, I suggested the
following continuum attempting to site types of disputes along a facilitativeevaluative dimension:

19. See infra text and accompanying notes 20-24.
20. See Stempel, supra note 1, at 285-92 nn. 155-78.
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CONTINUUM

Facilitativ End
Custody
Visitation
Divorce

Evaluative End

Franchise
License

Stranger Tort
Stranger Contract
Acquaintance Tort
Acquaintance Contract
Stranger Criminal
Acquaintance Criminal
Intellectual Property
Insurance Coverage

Employment
Acquaintance Civil Rights
Stranger Civil Rights
Statutory Interpretation
I use the term "acquaintance" to describe a dispute in which the contestants have
some historical or ongoing connection. I use the term "stranger" to describe a
dispute in which the parties' contact is largely confined to the facts and
circumstances of the instant dispute.
Even in this simplified form, two dimensional as opposed to the fourdimensional approach of the Riskin Grid,2' it is apparent that generalizations are
difficult to make. Generalizations by subject matter alone are particularly limited in
utility. For example, although one might at first blush think that a breach of contract
suit (where there are strongly established default legal rules and some certainty over
legal "rights" and where the transaction is often inherently about money) would align
more to the evaluative end of the spectrum while a custody matter (where the parties
have a mutual interest in a third party's welfare and personal norms may well be
more important than legal default rules) would align more reliably with the
facilitative end of the spectrum.
However, as discussion of this aspect of my paper proceeded both at the
Missouri lecture and in a UNLV faculty workshop, I became increasingly convinced
that the subject matter of the dispute has relatively little to do with whether a more
facilitative or evaluative eclectic mediation would be more apt. Rather than subject
specific, the key determinants of the preferred approach will be context specific and
are almost sui generis:
*

the past relationship of the parties;

*

current relations;

*

prospects for future relations;

*

the stakes of the dispute;

21. See Riskin, supra note 16.
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the certainty or uncertainty supplied by the legal regime that provides the
"shadow of the law" necessary for many as a reference point for
bargaining (e.g., clarity of default rule, existence of helpful or controlling
precedent);
"

the stakes of the dispute;

"

the divisibility of the matter at stake;

•

the substitutability of items at issue;

•

the political, public opinion and social climate; and

"

the personality of the parties.

Based on feedback in Missouri and Nevada and continuing reflection on the
area, I am now fumly convinced that these factors are what determines the apt mix
of facilitation and evaluation in mediation. Whether the dispute is about contracts,
torts, child custody, or civil rights has far less impact.
In addition, the case for evaluation (or at least the freedom to evaluate) is
perhaps stronger than I have realized even in areas where society would prefer to see
a facilitative resolution. For example, in a divorce involving minor children, there
is something inherently attractive about the notion of the splitting spouses working
through a purely facilitative process to arrange child custody. We think, perhaps
(pardon the term) romantically about the marriage that did not work but where the
spouses do not hate one another, are still bound by love of the children, and wish to
achieve the best arrangement for the family irrespective of legal rules.
But it does not follow that an acceptable result will occur from pure facilitative
mediation even under these ideal conditions. To take an extreme example for
illustrative purposes, the spouses might decide on joint custody with the children in
one home on odd-numbered days and in another home on even-numbered days. But
most experts in family and child psychology would probably deem this arrangement
nutty even under the best of circumstances. The fact that the divorcing spouses have
come together in harmony on this resolution is nice - but it still does not mean that
a mediator or a system in which the mediator acts, should countenance this
arrangement.
As Kim Kovach and Lela Love point out in their commentary on the main
article, a skilled facilitative mediator can attack this problem through pointed
questioning such as:
Your proposal is that your child spend three days with you a week,
including school weeks. That will involve a bus commute for Danny to
and from school, an hour and a half each way, when he is staying with
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you. Have you considered how spending three hours on a bus on school
days will impact your son?22
Laying aside the possibility that such pointed questioning is really more in the
evaluative end of the spectrum or the evaluative sector of Riskin's Grid,23 it still may
not be enough. A more firm evaluative approach may be necessary by the mediator.
Perhaps he should tell the divorcing parents if they have amicably but crazily hit
upon a custody arrangement that no sane court will approve and force continued
discussion rather than allowing an inapt "resolution" that may soon prove
unworkable or be set aside by a court.
This type of scenario raises the question of whether the mediator is competent
to engage in various degrees of evaluation. Facilitators have raised this issue as a
defense against permitting any evaluation. I prefer to consider the issue as one
requiring that the eclectic mediator be at least modestly familiar with the substantive
subject matter of the dispute. An experienced family law attorney may fill the bill
in the hypothetical above, but perhaps the mediator in this scenario is better served
by psychological or sociological training.24 As much as I find lawyers largely wellsuited to do eclectic mediation, further reflection on the issue of types of disputes
and types of mediation technique suggests to me another reason for not making
mediation the exclusive province of lawyers.
E. The PersistentPresence of FormalistDichotomies and Their Possible Uses
The tensions discussed above have permeated the law throughout the Twentieth
Century (probably forever). We should not be surprised if they persist during the
Twenty-First and contribute to the continuing vitality of a facilitative-evaluative
debate.
To some extent, a degree of formalist classification is inevitable and essential
to daily existence. Simply to decide whether to leave the house, humans make
"either/or" classifications. Is the weather "hot" or "cold?" Is it "raining" outside or
dry? (An assessment less important in Las Vegas but not completely eradicated from
human cognition even there.) Classification similarly helps organize and assess legal

22. See Lela P. Love & Kimberlee K. Kovach, ADR: An Eclectic Array of Processes Rather than
One Eclectic Process, 2000 J. Disp. RESOL. 295.
23. Love & Kovach describe this technique as "reality testing" distinguished from "neutral evaluation"
Id. at 303-05. Although the question posed in the child custody hypothetical is less evaluative than the
mediator saying "the idea of three days per week custody is nuts," the pointed question posited by Love
& Kovach is indeed possessed of evaluative edge and yet they consider it proper facilitative mediation.
This hypothetical thus illustrates quite well the degree to which fidelity to a term or theoretical concept
can get in the way of real world applications of ADR. The reality testing of pointed questions is at least
partly evaluative and it is perfectly proper mediation. So, too, is the mediator noting that a disputant's
settlement target far exceeds any damages award ever rendered by a court in connection with the type
of claim at issue. These mediator techniques, as well as the more purely facilitative technique of
drawing out the desires of the disputants, should all be recognized as permissible mediation. Under an
eclectic regime, it would be - and dispute resolution professionals could move on to more pressing
matters.
24. 1am grateful to Lisa Key for pointing this out in discussion following the Missouri presentation.
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topics such as mediation style. Although those of us who prefer to self-identify as
functionalist would prefer that classifications and rules be written with suitable
breadth and flexibility, we must at least concede that some rules and classifications
are necessary if one is to have a coherent system of law - or anything else.
The hard questions at the margin are the particular rules or standards to enact
or enunciate and the degree of flexibility accorded in their application. Similarly,
the relevant professional community must determine whether to codify or banish
certain rules and categories. I have argued for moving away from or beyond the
facilitative-evaluative debate by codifying a view of mediation that is broad, flexible,
and eclectic - one that vests substantial discretion with the mediator. Others have
agreed. Richard Birke calls even more forcefully for an end to even the
conversational terminology.25 John Lande, however, finds some continued value in
the efforts of facilitative mediators to set forth an "ideal type" of mediation as
facilitative and notes several benefits from the "good fight" that facilitators have
fought for this ideal.26 To the extent that the facilitators have standards rather than
rules or theology, I find a good deal of merit in Lande's "qualified praise" of the
facilitative community."
Lande's comments have forced me to see even the most zealous facilitators in
a more positive light. On a policy level, I continue to believe that the broad, eclectic,
discretion-vested vision of mediation should be what our society enshrines as "good"
mediation. But on the level of intellectual presence, Lande has convinced me that
we should not completely eradicate the continuing facilitative-evaluative dialogue
from the scene. Like Birke, however, I continue to think that we should move
"beyond" the facilitative-evaluative debate to the extent that we spend less
intellectual energy on this divide and invest more research and hard thinking into
other dispute resolution issues.
F. Remembering the Benefits of Simple Negotiation and What This
Suggests About the Facilitative-EvaluativeDebate
On the matter of negotiation, the modem ADR movement has arguably been a
mixed blessing. On one hand, raised dispute resolution consciousness has led to
raised consciousness about bargaining and negotiation. There abounds an array of
scholarship addressing game theory and the teachings that cognitive psychology may
bring to bear on negotiated dispute resolution. 28 On the proverbial other hand, the
current rapture about mediation and ADR proceeds from the unspoken premise that
the judicial system has failed, and so has the legal profession, in adequately
representing its disputing clients. Although this is hardly a golden age of

25. See Richard Birke, Evaluation and Facilitation:Moving Past Either/Or,2000 J. DisP. RESOL.
309.
26. See John Lande, Toward More SophisticatedMediation Theory, 2000 J. DiSP. RESOL. 321.
27. See Stempel, supra note 1, at 270 nn.94-95 (describing the distinction between more rigid "rules"
and more flexible "standards" and arguing that overly rule-bound orientation impedes analysis).
28. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sorry: The Regret Aversion Theory of Litigation
Behavior, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 43; Russell Korobkin, A Positive Theory of Legal Negotiation, 88 GEO.
L.J. 1789 (2000); Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New
Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REv. 77 (1997).
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adjudication, neither has the system become so clogged and ineffective as to create
chaos.
More important, despite the current gnashing of teeth about the decline in
29
lawyer professional values and the rise of "Rambo litigation" techniques, the fact
remains that most litigation does result in party-determined settlement, usually with
the help of counsel, and no formal invocation of ADR or the courts beyond the filing
of pleadings and some discovery."
In short, the traditional "sue and settle" system continues to work to a large
degree. If anything, it may be improving as the law school curriculum provides
additional information to students about negotiation as an art and science and gives3 1
to students less suggestion that the highest form of lawyering is full dress litigation.
Modem law students are conversant with Getting to Yes and its progeny. 32 Their
forebears were not, at least not in terms of formal education. Despite the modem
clucking about "Rambo litigation," in practice I found older litigators to be more
strident and bellicose than lawyers my own age (perhaps in part because they were
older litigators attempting to bully a neophyte). In the rush of enthusiasm over ADR
and the occasional stories of "over-the-top" litigation, we should not lose sight of the
fact that most lawyers do a more than credible job of helping clients find common
ground in the face of adversity. To the extent that lawyering has gotten harder and
meaner in the late Twentieth Century, it is more likely the result of clients and
economic pressures rather than lawyer indifference to the possibility of valuemaximizing negotiation.33

29. The term "Rambo litigation," although having achieved its apparent zenith during the 1980s,
continues to be employed today. It is based on the Sylvester Stallone movie character John Rambo, a
soldier who literally took no prisoners but dispatched hundreds or thousands of the enemy in three 1980s
movies. See also Richard L. Marcus, Apocalypse Now?, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1267 (1987) (using Rambo
character as springboard for his review of PETER SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC
DISASTERS IN THE COURTS (1985)).
30. In fact, despite mythology to the contrary, there is usually no discovery conducted in litigation
prior to settlement. In only about five percent of civil litigation is there what most would agree are
heavy or substantial. discovery costs. See generally JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., JUST, SPEEDY AND
INEXPENSIVE? AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM
ACT (1996); JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE
CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT (1996); THOMAS E. WILLGING ET AL., FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER.,

James S.
Kakalik et al., Discovery Management: FurtherAnalysis of the Civil Justice Reform Act Evaluation
Data, 39 B.C. L. REV. 613 (1998); Thomas E. Willging et al., An EmpiricalStudy of Discovery and
DisclosurePractice Under the 1993 FederalRule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REv. 525 (1998).
31. Prior to the modem ADR movement, negotiation was not even taught as a separate law school
discipline. Today, there are a variety of courses and excellent coursebooks and exercises on the topic.
See, e.g., ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE VALUE IN DEALS
AND DISPUTES (2000).
32. See ROGER FISCHER & WILLIAM S. URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING CONSENT WITHOUT
GIVING IN (1981). At least, in my own probably uninformed way, I regard Getting to Yes as the
inaugural work in the modem field of conflict resolution through negotiation even though it has
precursors in publications and activities.
33. See Bryant G. Garth, Two Worlds of Civil Discovery: From Studies of Cost and Delay to the
Markets in Legal Services and Legal Reform, 39 B.C. L. REV. 597 (1998); Bryant Garth, From Civil
Litigation to PrivateJustice:Legal Practiceat War with the Profession and its Values, 59 BROOK. L.
REV. 931 (1993) (stating that discovery problems are confined to small set cases where litigants dispute
with ferocity over large stakes, often expending considerable resources; character of civil litigation has
DISCOVERY AND DISCLOSURE PRACTICE, PROBLEMS AND PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE (1997);
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Because negotiation works most of the time, we should realize that this tells us
something about the disputes that do not resolve themselves through bilateral
communication prior to mediation or other forms of ADR. Almost by definition,
these are disputes where the parties (or their counsel) are not communicating
effectively, have not properly assessed the situation, are unrealistic in expectations,
are acting in bad faith, face factors unique to the case, or perhaps need a definitive
legal adjudication. The facilitative mediator can often improve communication, selfknowledge, or situation assessment - but not always.34 Often, the mediated dispute
(which, logically, should have settled through negotiation in most cases) requires the
more evaluative involvement of a neutral third party to strip away the plaque that has
prevented negotiation from reaching resolution. Viewed in this light, we should
again not be surprised that most mediation is eclectic in order to be effective.
G. The Comparative Question: Mediation andAdjudication
To some extent, my championing of eclectic mediation that permits elements of
evaluation has begged the question regarding the quality of substantive outcomes
achieved in adjudication. I have implicitly suggested that the default legal regime
that obtains in the absence of settlement is by and large a good one. I have implicitly
suggested that most adjudication results, although perhaps too slow and expensive
in coming, are by and large sound and just results. This view is certainly open to
challenge. One might, for example, assert that adjudication and the default legal
regime are sufficiently incoherent and unfair, that this should not be the gauge for
assessing substantive outcomes. Rather, other criteria like party satisfaction, cost,
delay, or expenditure of public resources should govern. 35

changed since 1970s because of increasing importance of civil litigation among commercial entities with
means to wage protracted litigation wars).
34. For example, in their commentary, Love & Kovach describe the resolution brought about in a case
where
damages for a back injury is in issue. Having the claimant explain to an adjuster her actual
suffering can shift the dialogue to one in which the parties are jointly seeking a solution.
In one situation involving a back injury, a claimant described not being able to cook for
her family and having to endure her hated mother-in-law cooking meals in the claimant's
kitchen, while she lay on the floor helplessly. Her voice, expressing her pain, and the vivid
details in her story, resulted in the insurance adjuster reassessing his doubts about the
severity of the back injury and ultimately wanting to resolve the matter in a mutually
satisfactory manner. Once parties are motivated to find a resolution, the rest is easy.
See Love & Kovach, supra note 22, at 302.
What Love & Kovach do not note, however, is that this case should have been resolved at the outset,
without any need for mediation, had the parties and lawyers been negotiating intelligently. To be sure,
there may have been something magical when the adjuster could in fact hear and see the pain of the
claimant. But good lawyers communicate this effectively in negotiation without the need for invoking
an ADR infrastructure. Although the presence of the third party mediator and the coming together in
mediation as an event and process is valuable, it often occurs in cases like this because for some reason,
the negotiation that should have been sufficient fell short. In cases like this one, facilitative mediation
is enough to make up for the factors that defeated negotiated solution - but in other cases, less facilitative
and more evaluative approaches may be necessary.
35. 1appreciate Chris Guthrie raising this point during the Missouri presentation.
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Again, I remain something of a traditionalist on these issues. For the most part,
the American legal system - both its substantive body of law (the default rules36
that create much of the shadow of the law in which to bargain) and its adjudicative
machinery - have worked well. Although there are of course the occasional
injustices (perhaps more than occasional judging from the pages of legal
periodicals), it appears that adjudication reaches acceptable results most of the time.
Certainly, ADR advocates have not put forth a better yardstick, although they have
suggested comparative advantages from ADR application of the default legal rules,
particularly the rigidity or limitation of remedies available at court.
Until there is an alternative organizing construct, the body of legal principles
and adjudicative outcomes should remain the standard by which we measure justice
in ADR. To be sure, party satisfaction is important. To the extent it reveals
advantages for mediation and other ADR methods over adjudication, this is a
powerful brief for ADR - but it is not the sole criterion for evaluating ADR
outcomes. Once again, at least some limited role for evaluation according to
prevailing legal norms remains necessary. At least for the moment, this brings us
back to eclectic mediation as the preferred methodology.

II. POINTS OF ENGAGEMENT WITH THE COMMENTARY
The comments on the main article are thoughtful, insightful, and even tactful in
that most of the commentators are identified as facilitators and they have responded
to my "attack" on facilitative orthodoxy with intellectual engagement rather than
defensiveness. The response of the commentators also suggests to me that there is
indeed substantial common ground among dispute resolution professionals and
observers. I prefer to call that common ground eclectic mediation and to advocate
its "codification" as the mainstream of mediation.
Kovach and Love appear not to be against evaluation per se but rather want
mediation to be a more purely facilitative process. They are not so much opposed
to evaluation in dispute resolution, but they want it called something other than
mediation so that true mediation need not be muddied in identity.37 Although their
perspective is attractive, I think it would ultimately prove unworkable in practice.
Indeed, it already has. Despite state statutes defining mediation as facilitative and
despite the policing of a facilitative orthodoxy by some states, mediation appears to
be eclectic in practice.3 8 At some point, the Kovach and Love preference for cleaner
categorization of dispute resolution methods must yield to reality and practicality.

36. The term "default rule" has become so ingrained in current legal scholarship that its popularizers
no longer receive as much credit as they should for drawing attention to the importance of this concept
through a range of legal issues. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87 (1989). In my view, this is the key
article in this modem trend. The article has been cited in more than 300 other law review articles since
its publication.
37. See Love & Kovach, supra note 22.
38. See Stempel, supra note I, at 267-69 nn.79-90; Golann, supra note 16 (describing case studies
of actual mediations in which mediators used both facilitative and evaluative techniques to resolve
disputes and that tactics changed during the course of the mediation process).
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When people, even pretty sophisticated people, talk about mediation, they mean
eclectic mediation. Only in the ranks of those with a great expertise is the
facilitative-evaluative division finely observed.
To the extent one is concerned, as Kovach and Love are, about the degree to
which parties may be disserved or surprised by trace elements of evaluation in the
mediation they envisioned as facilitative, there are in crudest form two solutions.
Society could attempt to slice mediation into finer categories and work hard to make
sure that through disclosure and dispatching the parties get the subcategory of
dispute resolution they need or desire. Alternatively, society could endorse eclectic
mediation and let the mediator in a case-by-case basis mediate eclectically, using as
little or as much evaluation as may be necessary to further the process. I opt for the
latter approach on both theoretical and practical grounds.
To be sure, the eclectic regime puts significant responsibility on mediators, but
so does a purely facilitative approach. To prevent abuses of either technique, the
answer lies in having qualified mediators who do not assume inappropriate roles,
play favorites, or abuse power.
As a practical matter, although work in the field suggests that eclectic mediation
is what actually happens and what is here to stay, I suspect that most mediation done
under an expressly eclectic regime will be largely facilitative. Although it may not
have the linguistic clarity sought by Kovach and Love, it will probably not produce
mediations displeasing to them - at least no more than occurs today.
Most important, eclectic mediation will minimize consumer confusion. Under
the Kovach and Love construct, a mediator who is unable to move forward with
purely facilitative techniques must logically either abandon the enterprise, expressly
flag for the parties her movement into a more evaluative mode (even if only for a
moment) and obtain party consent to the shift, or dispatch the disputants to another
forum to proceed with neutral evaluation or some other ADR method. But the
parties signed up for, or were referred to, mediation. They expect mediation, they
hope for "one-stop shopping" for their dispute (subject to reverting to the litigation
default if necessary), and they are not nearly as concerned as academicians about the
precise techniques deployed as long as the process brings acceptable resolution.
Even the most sophisticated disputants will be confused and possibly put off by a
mediator's strict adherence to the facilitative mode interrupted by bursts of selfconscious rhetoric about changing modes or a mediator's decision to alter or end the
process in which the parties have invested substantial effort.
Zena Zumeta takes me to task for not specifically addressing transformative
mediation.39 This is somewhat fair criticism. First, although transformative purists
will probably disagree, I have generally regarded transformative mediation as a
subset of facilitative mediation. Sure, transformative mediation has particular
techniques and a somewhat more ambitious goal (changing lives) than garden variety
facilitative mediation (producing party-generated resolution of disputes), but both
processes are distinct from a purely evaluative or highly eclectic approach.
Consequently, the main article's thesis regarding the facilitative-evaluative divide
applies as well to transformative mediation. At least I think it does. Zumeta's

39. See Zumeta, supra note 15, at 335 ("Stempel leaves out a new thrust in mediation, the
transformative mediation movement.").
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thoughtful commentary does not persuade me otherwise. She notes that I do not
expressly discuss transformative mediation but then does not produce any analysis
suggesting that this omission (if it is an omission) undermines the thesis of the main
article (although she articulates other analyses taking issue with the article).
Although not submitting written commentary to this symposium, Leonard
Riskin provided useful commentary at the lecture itself. He had limited time but did
note a few "quibbles" (his word) with the main article that prompt me toward
clarification. He read the main article as suggesting that lawyers were nearly
uniform in being high on the evaluation end of the eclectic spectrum and that
nonlawyers were equally high on the facilitation end of the continuum. I certainly
did not mean to take this extreme a view and apologize for any unclarity in the main
article. My thesis as to general professional norms is just that - a general thesis of
general group orientation, I do assert that on the whole, lawyers are more inclined
to be evaluators than nonlawyers. I do not assert that all lawyers are evaluators and
all nonlawyers are facilitators.
Riskin also took me to task for understating the degree to which a mediator may
avoid what I regard as the pitfalls of too passive an approach by using activist
facilitation techniques such as guiding the parties to insight through questioning. I
agree and certainly would prefer that mediators use these sorts of techniques rather
than brute evaluation - if the situation permits. In a smaller category of cases,
however, my position is simply that the mediator may need to move beyond guiding
questions and inform or "tell" the parties that a position is beyond the range of
reasonable adjudicative outcomes in order to break logjams or avoid unfairness.
Gary Gill-Austern's comments 40 represent perhaps a more doctrinaire defense
of mediation than even those of Kovach and Love, who I have generally regarded
as the leading advocates of facilitative purity in mediation. I do not fird myself in
great disagreement with much of what he says: mediation should attempt to be a
process of understanding and party-generated solutions with less evaluation rather
than more, mediation should not become too much like arbitration or litigation,
mediation should leave the parties feeling content with any resulting resolution, and
mediation has significant transformative potential.
I am concerned, however, that Gill-Austern's faith in mediation is too much of
a faith based on a romantic, almost theological view of the process rather than faith
based on empirical evidence and substantive rationality. As much as I agree with his
general orientation toward less adversarial models of dispute resolution, I am
concerned whenever adherence to any social policy becomes something of a creed.
I feel, for example, the same way about some of the writings of Owen Fiss, who has
criticized settlement and argued that we need adjudication to establish social norms,
often norms that will not be adequately generated through the political process. 41 As
much as I admire Fiss' writing in this area and its reminder that we must not forget
core values in the face of the trendiness of ADR, neither should we become
"litigation romanticists" (as Carrie Menkel-Meadow has suggested).42 Even issues

40. See Gary L. Gill-Austern, Faithful, 2000 J. Disp. RESOL. 343.
41. See Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
42. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Narrowing the Gap by Narrowing the Field: What's Missing From
the McCrate Report, 69 WASH. L. REv. 593 (1994).
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like race discrimination and school integration can be resolved with means other than
litigation. In fact, they may well be better resolved outside the litigation context so long as Brown v. Boardand its progeny have provided a sufficient shadow of the
law in which to mediate. Just as one should not be a litigation romanticist, one
should not be a facilitative mediation romanticist.
Gill-Austem's ideological commitment to facilitative mediation prompts him to
question whether I have created "horrible hypotheticals" that have no relation to
reality. He suggests my proposed pitfalls of overly pure facilitative mediation in
certain contexts "might spark more concern were there an abundance, or even
several, examples from real life."43 Here, his devotion to mediation has blinded him
to the empirical reality in my article. In the article, I noted a real situation in which
an observer saw arguable abuses of facilitative mediation disadvantaging the wife
in a divorce." I also noted the several Florida mediation cases in which (prior to the
Florida Supreme Court's February 2000 decision adopting revised rules):
*

a mediator could not tell a debtor that he was about to agree to a settlement
that imposed an interest45 rate upon him three times greater than the rate
imposed on judgments;

*

a mediator could not disclose secreted property in a divorce matter;46 and

*

a mediator could not even ask a wrongful death claimant, who appeared
to have omitted a loss of consortium claim, whether he intended not to
bring a consortium claim.47

These are all real examples, not my mental musings. Although few in number,
they undoubtedly reveal a potential unfairness problem with pure facilitative
mediation that is so "high church" that it cannot eclectically adapt to the dispute at
issue. The article also noted the significant concern of feminist scholars that
facilitative mediation could disadvantage women in marital dissolution.48
An undercurrent of the Gill-Austem comment seems to be that Leonard Riskin
has in some way strayed from the one true path of good dispute resolution. GillAuster expresses dismay that Riskin's seminal 1996 article49 appears to embrace the
eclectic mediation by actual mediators described in the article - or at least Riskin
is not in Gill-Austem's view sufficiently critical of these findings. Gill-Austern

43. See Gill-Auster, supra note 40, at 365-64 n.85.
44. See Scott M. Hughes, Elizabeth's Story, 8 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 553 (1995) (cited in Stempel,
supra note 1,at 252 n.21,
45. See Stempel, supra note 1, at 260 n.48.
46. See Stempel, supra note 1, at 260-61 n.49.
47. See Stempel, supra note 1,at 261 n.50.
48. See Stempel, supra note 1, at 255 n.30 (citing Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce
Mediation and the Politics of Power, 40 BuFF. L. REv. 441 (1992); Trina Grillo, The Mediation
Alternative: Process Dangersfor Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 (1991)).
49. See Riskin, supra note 16.
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contrasts this with Riskin's also important 1982 article Mediation by Lawyers,0 a
work Gill-Austern notes was inspirational to him as a law student.5'
So, what has taken place in fourteen years? Has Riskin been corrupted by the
evaluative components of the real world and the osmosis of working at law schools?
I think not. Rather than seeing Riskin's scholarship as a losing of the faith, I see his
work as evolving to reflect the reality of mediation in practice and demonstrating a
subtle appreciation for the complexities of the topic. In the highest academic
tradition, Riskin is not making an advocate's brief for evaluative mediation, he is
simply studying mediation and examining the implications of different styles of
mediation.52 To be sure, this work has stirred the metaphorical pot among dispute
resolution professionals and scholars, but we are all the better for it."
Just as excessive zeal about facilitation is unwise, it is equally unwise to be
blinded by adherence to an overly evaluative concept of mediation. For that reason,
I found much to recommend in John Lande's commentary of "qualified praise" for
facilitative mediation.54 He notes that the facilitative mediation community and
spokespersons like Kovach, Love, Zumeta, and Gill-Austem provide a valuable
service in preventing dispute resolution from bending too far toward the evaluative
end of the spectrum. I agree and find these commentators, including Lande, giving
me pause. At the very least, eclectic mediation must be done by mediators sensitive
to the perils of evaluation as well as sensitive to the shortcomings of facilitation.
Some degree of supervision or review may also be necessary.
On another point (addressed further below), Lande praises facilitators for
helping to keep mediation from becoming the exclusive domain of lawyers." I
agree, for a variety of reasons. Despite being an admitted lawyer chauvinist, who
finds much to recommend from eclectic mediation by lawyers, I hope the field is
never overly dominated by lawyers.
But, as Lande has suggested in informal conversation with me, the devil is in the
details regarding our mutual concerns: How much evaluation is too much? What is
the proper sociological balance between lawyers and nonlawyers in mediation?
Indeed, what is the proper ratio of facilitation and evaluation in a world of eclectic
mediation?
We cannot, of course, answer these questions in either a presumptive way or
with scientific precision. As a result, I continue to remain committed to both an
eclectic model of mediation and a common law approach to mediation, one that
reacts to particular disputes rather than seeking to achieve grand rules of conduct or
categorizations.

50. See Leonard Riskin, Mediation by Lawyers, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 29 (1982).
51. See Gill-Austern, supra note 40, at 357 n.64.
52. Readers should not confuse Riskin's nonjudgmental academic inquiry as support for too much
evaluation in mediation. In commentary on my paper and in his writings, Riskin appears to prefer that
mediation be as facilitative as possible under the circumstances.
53. Although the Riskin Grid article became something of a lightning rod on the issue, Riskin did not
invent the controversy but instead identified it, with a corresponding catalytic impact on scholarship in
the area. Four years after the article appears, we continue to refer to it and debate its underlying
implications.
54. See Lande, supra note 26.
55. See Lande, supra note 26.
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In his very helpful commentary, Richard Birke notes the overwhelming presence
of eclecticism and the futility of rigorous categorization.16 He appears to agree with
me that it is a false dichotomy and argues that the debate should be ended in order
to permit the dispute resolution community to move on toward more important
issues. I, of course, am happy to move beyond the false either/or, proper/improper,
right/wrong dichotomy of the facilitative debate so long as the consensus or stasis
Birke seeks is an eclectic one that does not choke off the development and
deployment of effective mediation styles.
In addition, Lande's qualified praise of the facilitative ethos has prompted me
to qualify my agreement with Birke in part. Although mediation scholars clearly
need to address a number of important topics affecting dispute resolution, it is not
necessary to eliminate all work and continued debate on the facilitative-evaluative
issue. Essentially, the "war" is over, and eclectic mediation has carried the day and
probably will continue to be the dominant form of mediation. However, continued
attention to mediation styles can ensure that the eclectic mix of modem mediation
does not become a new orthodoxy. Lande seems particularly concerned that
mediation may become overly evaluative and sees a use for facilitative purists
"blowing the whistle" should this occur. At the very least, facilitators can be
mediation's watchdogs in this regard. They may also contribute additional
information on selective uses of particular facilitative techniques.
Thus, on balance, I have been convinced that some continuing scholarly tension
along the facilitative-evaluative dimension should not fade completely from the
scene. However, it should fade to the background rather than maintain center stage.

III. A CONTINUING AGENDA FOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION
PROFESSIONALS AND SCHOLARS
As the new century unfolds, dispute resolution as a field faces a number of
specific issues more pressing than reaching complete accord regarding mediation
styles or "resolving" the facilitative-evaluative debate (which is probably not subject
to complete consensus due to the variety of persons, groups and cases involved in
dispute resolution). In this section, I am suggesting something of an agenda for
dispute resolution research that involves two dimensions: "epidemiological" and
"operational."
"Epidemiological" information in the dispute resolution context is greater
knowledge about the efficacy of dispute resolution (including lack of efficacy or
collateral problems). At this juncture, alternative dispute resolution has for the past
ten to twenty years been riding a wave and gaining significant ground on litigation.
Lawsuits and the litigation system get continued bad press while arbitration and
mediation are lionized (often without sufficient reflection) as panaceas to the delay,
cost, and aggravation of litigation. Legal doctrine since the 1970s has shown greater

56. See Birke, supra note 25.
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favor toward ADR.57 Greater infrastructure now surrounds ADR in both law schools
and the real world.
But missing or underdeveloped in this mix is a real knowledge of how well or
poorly various ADR methods work in practice. The general information to date
suggests that procedures such as arbitration, mediation, and early neutral evaluation
("ENE") have worked because (a) they remove cases from the system, and (b) the
parties are satisfied with the resulting resolution of cases. The justice system needs
more detailed information if ADR is to be maintained and improved.
For example, more study is needed on the issue of settlement rates. Although
ADR is successful at a high rate, one could also classify litigation as "successful" in
that upwards of 90% of civil cases settle prior to trial even if nothing is done.5"
Current data is relatively scarce on the question of settlement timing, resources
expended, party satisfaction, and quality of outcomes. In short, one cannot say with
certainty how much mediation either speeds resolution, makes it cheaper, or makes
it a more satisfactory resolution than would have occurred without the third party
mediator. There are significant theoretical works supporting the common sense view
that a mediator is a resolution catalyst, and significant empirical data supporting that
view, 123425 but hardly enough information either to consider the issue settled or
inarguable.
An obvious task for ADR researchers is the determination of the degree to
which ADR, particularly mediation, advances settlement along the dimensions of
speed, cost, satisfaction and quality. Related to this is the question of the
determinants of dispute resolution when parties merely negotiate in the face of
pending litigation. We should ask not only how these results compare to ADR but
also the extent to which these results vary according to the activities and orientation
of counsel and the parties. As we now teach law students, one can be a good,
"value-adding" negotiator or a bad, antipathy-creating negotiator. We should also
know a good deal more about how this works in practice. Again, a significant
amount of strong theoretical work has taken place, but relatively little empirical
examination exists concerning the lawyer-negotiator's impact on dispute resolution,
both in and out of formal mediation.
On the question of litigant satisfaction and just outcomes, much remains to be
done. If, as I suggest, these two dimensions are an important source of differing
views on the facilitative-evaluative question, it behooves the profession to know
more about disputants' views on ADR outcomes and to make some assessment of
the substantive quality of ADR outcomes. Currently, however, our information is
largely restricted to surveys of disputant (or, more likely, attorney) satisfaction
shortly after resolution. If party satisfaction is to be the touchstone of evaluating
ADR, there should at least be longitudinal data indicating whether party views
toward the settlement are stable over time. A disputant may become more sanguine
about case resolution as time goes by or may find initial satisfaction turning into

57. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Arbitral Infatuationand the Decline of Consent, 62 BROOK. L. REV. 1380
(1996); Jeffrey W. Stempel, A Better Approach to Arbitrability, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1377 (1991) (discussing
Supreme Court's shift from legal doctrine resistant to enforcement of arbitration agreements to one
highly solicitous of such agreements).
58. See generally Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and
Regulation of Settlement, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339 (1994).
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embitterment, a feeling of regret or "being had." The extent to which either
evolution of feeling occurs should be a major yardstick in our assessment of
mediation or any other dispute resolution device.
I speak of dispute resolution or ADR rather than mediation alone because the
party satisfaction measure and its temporal stability is an important gauge of the
quality of ENE, arbitration, med-arb, summary jury trials, and plain vanilla litigation
as well. In all these areas, there is data, but not definitive data. In particular, studies
to date have been content to measure either attorney satisfaction as a proxy for party
satisfaction or to measure satisfaction on the heels of the settlement. To fully
evaluate user views of ADR, there must be sustained examination that does not
measure party attitude only in the near aftermath when there may be either
disappointment or euphoria.
On the. quality of outcomes dimension, there has been even less examination.
Lawyers have long held the view that "settlement is the best justice," suggesting that
party satisfaction was the evaluative dimension for assessing dispute resolution long
before the modem ADR movement blossomed. This same attitude has dominated
the dispute resolution community, leading to relative disinterest in assessing the
wisdom of the case resolutions resulting from mediation or old-fashioned
unbrokered negotiation. However, if professionals are to praise the effectiveness of
either mediation or private ordering through settlement, there should be at least some
reliable indication that the results obtained are substantively defensible.
We intuitively believe that the results are defensible because the modem,
Western tradition (holding relatively firm in what may have become a post-modem
world, at least in academia) posits that people are rational actors and would not agree
to or endorse mediated or negotiated settlements if the results were not reasonably
decent. This is probably correct but it is not, or at least should not, be gospel.
Society should have a better idea of what results from ADR (including ordinary
negotiation) as compared to fully adjudicated or arbitrated outcomes. Should there
be a divergence or a pattern of results, society must also determine whether these
findings require revision of the status quo. To take perhaps the most obvious
potential example: we may find that women in divorce do better or worse in
mediation than in litigation or negotiation in the shadow of litigation. If so, surely
that has implications for the manner in which we require (or don't require)
mediation, its conduct, and administration and review, including whether a mediator
stays on any jurisdiction's "approved list."
In short, there remains a good deal of empirical work to be done before we can
bless modem ADR as an unalloyed benefit to society. Knowledge of ADR needs to
progress beyond the theoretical and anecdotal in order to be accurately assessed.
On the operational dimension, ADR also faces a number of issues. By
"operational," I mean the rules and norms that govern the actual conduct of ADR,
particularly mediation. This includes questions of:
•

mediator certification,

•

mediator qualifications,

*

mediator training,
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•

mediator immunity,

•

mediation procedure and protocols,

•

the intersection of ADR and unauthorized practice of law regulations,

•

ADR ethics (particularly conflict of interest), and

•

administration of ADR.

Richard Birke stated it well in closing his commentary in this issue:
Let's have symposia on whether substantive expertise matters, whether
mediation should presumptively be multi-session or whether single
sessions can work, whether team mediation makes good sense and if so
when, what roles gendered and race-based assumptions play in our
mediations, whether absolute confidentiality is really a prerequisite for
successful mediation, what constitutes meaningful training, and other
important questions.S9
On the issue of mediator certification and mediator qualifications, much has
been written but the issue is far from resolution. Additional empirical work could
prove fruitful. Is there a difference in party satisfaction or outcomes depending upon
the existence and type of mediator certification in existence or the minimum
qualifications required for mediators? We can ask the same questions regarding the
regulation of arbitrators or ENE evaluators. To date, particularly for court-annexed
arbitrators, the judicial establishment has been content to find lawyers with more
than five years experience presumptively qualified. Perhaps this is too broad and
lenient a standard. In the mediation field, the qualification and certification debate
appears again to reflect some professional tension between lawyers and nonlawyers.
Before further legislation or rulemaking on these topics, the profession may wish to
await additional research and thinking on the issue.
Related to certification is the issue of mediator training. Training is now
required in practically every jurisdiction with court-connected or mandated
mediation but the training has hardly been evaluated. Some assessment should take
place, the results of which may argue for revised curricula for ADR training. Again,
while mediation has been the focal point of these discussions, the same issue applies
to arbitrators and other dispute resolvers.
Mediator immunity must also be addressed. To the extent that the mediator is
analogized to the judge, at least some degree of immunity would seem required, even
if it is not the strong immunity traditionally accorded to judges. However, this
question returns us to the facilitative-evaluative debate. If mediators are not
evaluators in any way, the rationale for immunity is undermined. But a party may
nonetheless claim to be harmed by negligent facilitation in mediation. This issue

59. See Birke, supra note 25, at 319.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2000

21

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2000, Iss. 2 [2000], Art. 10
JOURNAL OFDISPUTE RESOLUTION
[Vol. 2000, No. 2
needs further examination and a considered, probably nationally uniform, resolution
if mediation and other ADR is to advance to its full potential.
The nature of ADR, particularly the facilitative-evaluative debate in mediation,
also calls upon the profession to address the intersection of ADR and unauthorized
practice of law regulations. One argument of the facilitative camp in mediation is
that the facilitative approach avoids unauthorized practice regulation because the
mediator does not give legal advice - and does not in a pure facilitative model
provide opinions as to the range of case outcomes nor does she provide information
as to the default legal rules governing disputes. Perhaps true, but even for the purely
facilitative mediator there may be unauthorized practice issues. The facilitator
nonetheless presides over dispute resolution that may have significant legal impact
for the parties. Often this results in documentation of an agreement. Where the
parties are not represented by their own counsel, tere still arguably may be
questions of whether the mediator is acting as a "lawyer for the situation" that should
subject the mediator to unauthorized practice rules. 60
Lurking in the not-very-deep background of the unauthorized practice issue for
ADR is the professional tension between lawyers and nonlawyers. If jurisdictions
take an aggressive approach to unauthorized practice regulation of ADR, even pure
facilitative mediators are at risk and there will be hydraulic pressure to make
mediation an arena dominated almost exclusively by lawyers. Despite my attomey
chauvinism, I think this would be a most unfortunate result in that it would deprive
ADR of the expertise of nonattorneys, probably raise costs, and would probably
restrict the facilitative and transformative potential of mediation in the face of
dominance by more evaluatively inclined lawyers.
At the same time, my lawyer chauvinism makes me wary of too much more
erosion in unauthorized practice rules. For decades, society has permitted title
companies, realtors, insurance adjustors and document creators of all sorts to engage
in what seems uncomfortably close to the practice of law.6' Today, pressure abounds
to permit "multidisciplinary practice" where nonlawyer accountants or financial
experts may exert too much control over lawyers in their organizations.62 In short,
at the risk of being the stereotyped fuddy-duddy, I see some wisdom in at least
maintaining or even strengthening the current edifice regarding unauthorized
practice. The task for the immediate future is reconciling the values protected by
practice-of-law regulation and the value achieved through nonlawyer dispute
resolution, particularly in mediation. Valuable work has been done on the subject

60. 1 take the phrase "lawyer for the situation" from Louis Brandeis, who used the term during his
Supreme Court confirmation hearings when his legal ethics were questioned for representing both parties
to a business transaction. See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW (1978)
(describing Brandeis episode). Hazard later served as Reporter for the ABA Kutak Commission that
wrote the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which, in Model Rule 2.2, embodies the lawyer-for-the
situation ethos.
61. See generally GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A
HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, pt. 5, rule 5.5 (2d ed. 1994 & Supp.

1998); CHARLES WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 15.1 (1986).
62. See generally Symposium, Symposium on Multidisciplinary Practice,84 MINN. L. REV. 1083
(2000). For now, momentum in favor of multidisciplinary practice has been slowed by the American
Bar Association's rejection of a proposed amended Model Rule of Professional Conduct which would
have permitted and regulated multidisciplinary practice.
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but more remains to be done and policyrnakers will eventually need to take action
based on the information provided by the ADR and scholarly communities.
Related to lawyer regulation and ADR is the question of ADR ethics or the
professional responsibility of ADR professionals, particularly questions of conflict
of interest, compromised loyalty, and neutrality. As noted above, the issue of
neutrality is also important to achieving the proper mix of eclectic mediation.
Improper or excessive evaluation may result in an insufficiently neutral or impartial
mediator. To the extent that ADR is analogized to law practice, ADR professionals
should probably be subject to professional responsibility rules similar to those
governing attorneys. However, absolute parity risks undermining the flexibility and
nonlegal nature of much dispute resolution, particularly ADR.
An additional remaining "loose end" of ADR is its administration and control.
Currently, we have a relatively ad hoc world of ADR, with court-connected
programs, private organizations, and individual, free-lancing dispute resolvers,
including the nation's nearly one million attorneys. I have previously praised the
concept of the multi-door courthouse as a means of coordinating ADR efforts,
matching the most efficacious ADR to the situation, and providing some minimally
acceptable level of quality control (as well as the opportunity for better longitudinal
study).63
ADR as part of a multi-door courthouse concept continues to make sense to me,
but many in the ADR community probably are wary of too much government
involvement in the process. Although I might think that society could use a
"Ministry of Mediation" as much as Cardozo thought society could benefit from a
"Ministry of Justice,"' this view is hardly established among lawyers or others in the
ADR community. I would prefer to see some sustained exploration of the possibility
of more organized dispensation of ADR in coordination with the judicial system and
more active government involvement in ADR quality control. Private ordering has
its advantages and personal liberty should permit disputants to exit "the system" in
most cases. But for many disputants, particularly the unsophisticated or lawyerless,
a more established, even bureaucratic organization may be more efficacious.

IV. CONCLUSION
In short, much remains for ADR practitioners and scholars. Important
epidemiological and operational issues should be addressed and at least preliminarily
resolved by the ADR community soon. To the extent that the facilitative-evaluative

63. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reflections on JudicialADR and the Multi-Door Courthouse at Twenty:
FaitAccompli, FailedOverture, or Fledgling Adulthood?., I I OHIO ST. J. ON DiSP. RESOL. 297 (1996).
64. See Benjamin Cardozo, A Ministry of Justice, 35 HARV. L. REV. 113 (1921) (proposing that this
justice ministry regularly review and examine the laws, propose changes, eliminations, or additions as
necessary). His article was the driving force for states such as New York that established state law
revision commissions for this purpose. As many know, the history of law revision commissions
generally reflects a failure to achieve Cardozo's posited benefits. Although some might argue that this
indicates a failure of the concept, others (including me) would argue that most such commissions were
never adequately funded or supported by the legislative and executive branches, which tended to distrust
the notion of "expert" law revision by unelected private citizens.
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debate or related disagreement over technique diverts too much from these goals, the
debate should be "put behind" us. Most effectively, the ADR community can both
continue to monitor the mediator techniques issue and move more completely to
these other issues by embracing a sufficiently eclectic middle ground of acceptable
mediation.
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